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Abstract
This paper examines the deterrence e¤ect of two auditing rules via a laboratory experiment.
A traditional rule which is usually assumed in the auditing literature, audits a taxpayer with
a constant probability, which is independent of others tax returns. A bounded rule recently
proposed and analyzed in the literature chooses a sample from the population of reported low-
income taxpayers to audit, taking into account the capacity of the auditor. We nd that the
deterrence e¤ect of a bounded rule is as strong as that of a traditional rule, but is more cost-
e¤ective since fewer audits are conducted. The results lend further support to the bounded rule
as a more cost-e¤ective alternative to the traditional rule.
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1 Introduction
Auditing is universal in our society. For instance, external auditors examine company nancial
statement, corporate headquarters go through budget plans by business divisions, and regulators
keep an eye on the operation of banks. To date, the existing auditing literature has focused on
audit pricing, audit quality, and auditor independence (see, e.g. Nelson and Tan (2005)). However,
the comparison of di¤erent auditing rules has arguably been under explored, given the potential
for policy implication.
Tax auditing as an obvioius example.1 The literature on tax compliance so far mostly assumes
that audits are carried out in a simple randomized fashion, in which each taxpayer is independently
selected for audit with a given probability (see, for example, Moser et al. (1995), Zimbelman and
Waller (1999), Boylan and Sprinkle (2001), Kim et al. (2005), Kim and Waller (2005), and Alm
et al. (2009)). We term this the traditional rule. One undesirable feature of the traditional rule
is that audit resources are often used ine¢ ciently. Imagine that a tax auditor is applying the
traditional rule in examining a large number of tax return les. Since auditing decisions are carried
on a random basis, the auditor must commit a budget which allows a full audit of all the les.
Otherwise such strategy is not credible. However, these resources set aside for an audit units
activities have an opportunity cost to the organization. For instance, in the sical year 2005 and
2006, US IRS reserved $9,998 million and $10,461 million for tax administration and operations.
The unused budget, however, were $80.6 million and $104.6 million respectively (US Department
of the Treasury (2006)). If the IRS sets aside ample resources for audit purpose but could have
provided the same deterrence with fewer resources, the resources could have been better used
elsewhere. Consequently, an auditor might have greater latitude to formulate an audit strategy
than simply conducting independent randomized audits. Such e¢ cient auditing rules help to deter
tax evaders in a cheaper way, and hence saves auditing resources.
One way to solve this problem is to formulate an auditing strategy on the basis of the entire
taxpayer population. A recent model by Yim (2009) proposes and analyzes a new audit sampling
rule named the bounded rule. Simply put, the bounded rule chooses an audit sample from the
population of self-reported low-incometaxpayers, given a pre-committed audit capacity. It audits
1Although we frame our entire analysis and experiment in the context of tax compliance, the application could
extend to other related areas such as nancial audits (i.e. with public accounting rms checking on company clients),
internal audits (with corporate headquarters checking on business units), or other circumstances where regulators
need to check on inspectees to enforce the compliance of regulations (e.g., Chen and Johnston (2008); Lennox and
Pittman (2010)).
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a random selected sample of self-reported low-income whenever the number of these reports
exceeds audit capacity, or otherwise all of the reports. Yim (2009) shows that any compliance level
induced by a traditional rule as a Nash equilibrium can also be induced by a bounded rule, but with
substantially fewer reources committed.2 Hence, research to understand further the properties of a
bounded-rule has practical relevance to issues like audit sta¤ planning and compliance enforcement
e¢ ciency.
As the rst step to study the bounded rule, this paper aims at comparing its deterrence e¤ect
to the traditional rule in via a lab experiment. The laboratory allows us to directly test various
auditing rules in a controlled environment. Such control enables us to isolate the many factors that
confound behavior. In the meantime, it helps us to examine factors that are left out in the theory.
Our laboratory setting follows the basic features of the Yim (2009) model, which is an extension
of the classic tax compliance game by Graetz et al. (1986). Every taxpayer has a certain probability
of receiving high- or low-income. They have to decide simultaneously and independently whether
to report their incomes truthfully to the auditor. The auditor deducts taxes according to players
reported incomes, and performs di¤erent auditing rules according to treatments.
In the original Yim (2009) paper, the auditor formulates an audit strategy based on his expec-
tation of the taxpayers. In theory, we can construct the two auditing rules such that the induced
compliance level is the same when auditors and taxpayers play Nash equilibrium in both games.
Nevertheless, this requires a demanding understanding of the game and mutual belief towards each
othersactions. Any o¤-equilibrium decisions by the auditors will lead to the behavior of the tax-
payers uncomparable under the two rules. Hence, in this study, we control the auditor-taxpayer
interactions by letting the auditor commits to an announced audit rule. In this way, we make
sure that a bounded rule and a traditional rule induce the same deterrence power predicted by
theory. Consequently, this paper should be not considered as a direct test of the Yim (2009) model.
Instead, it focuses on examining whether and how human subjects react to the two rules.
We also examine the bounded rule under another parameter domain where the ex-ante proba-
bility of receiving high income increases. In reality, it resembles a rich neighborhood where every
taxpayer is likely to earn a high-income. The game induced by the bounded rule has a payo¤-
2 In real life, the audit probability of the traditional rule, which is determined from the standard one-to-one
analysis, has been interpreted as doing proportional sampling in settings with multiple inspectees. Simply put,
it means randomly selecting a constant proportion of the suspicious inspectees (i.e., those ling low-income tax
returns) for audit. Yim (2009) shows that the committed resource in the proportional sampling rule is still more than
that of the bounded rule. In fact, the bounded rule is proved to be a cost minimizing rule to generate a given level
of compliance.
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dominant equilibrium in which all taxpayers underreport, and risk-dominant equilibrium in which
all taxpayers report truthfully. We are interested in knowing whether the bounded rule still func-
tions, which depends on the equilibrium subjects selected in the presence of multiple equilibria.
The main results are the following. The bounded rule induces the same compliance level as the
traditional rule does. However, the bounded rule is more cost-e¤ective for two reasons. First, it
requires a lower amount of audits to sustain the same level of deterrence. Second, the committed
resources are used more e¢ ciently, i.e., the budget usage ratio is higher. In both treatments, the
absolute level of compliance is higher than theory prediction. Such behavior can be best explained
by a structural model incorporating loss aversion and stochastic measurement errors in forming
utility. The bounded rule generates even higher deterrence in the presence of multiple equilibria,
since taxpayers fail to coordinate on the zero-compliance outcome. All these results lend support
to the bounded rule as a more cost-e¤ective alternative to the traditional rule.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The rst examines alternative auditing rules
opposed to the simple random audit. For instance, Reinganum and Wilde (1985) analyze an audit
cuo¤ policy in which an audit is triggered if the reported income is below a certain threshold,
and otherwise no audit if the reported income is above the threshold. They show that there exists
an equilibrium where the audit probability is decreasing in the level of reported income; and the
all taxpayers under-report, although with an amount decreases in ture income. Bayer and Cowell
(2009) build a model to examine the e¤ect of a relative rule in a world where rms interact both
on production and tax-compliance decisions. In their model, the tax authority rst can commit a
relative audit rule under which a higher audit probability is assigned to a lower reported-income.
On the basis of this information, rms select their quantities and claim taxes. The result shows
that the relative audit rule is more deterrent than a xed, random audit rule when there is collusion
among rms in either production or tax-declaration. The bounded rule in our study shares the key
feature with the above rules that only low-income reports attract audit attention. Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002) provides a detail discussion on these alternative auditing rules.
The second literature uses experiments as a tool to study auditing rules. The traditional rule
and its variants are widely studied in this literature (see the literature review by Alm and McKee
(1998)). A meta study by Blackwell (2007) based on twenty laboratory experimental studies nds
that an increase in audit probability or ne rate leads to higher compliance, but the tax rate has
no signicant e¤ect. Alm et al. (1993) examine a cut-o¤ rule by combining a sure audit below a
threshold on reported income and a small, random audit above the threshold. This cut-o¤ rule,
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although is the most e¤ective in increasing compliance, requires a large amount of audits. Alm
and McKee (2004) consider another version of the cuto¤ rule with audit probability depending on
the deviation of an individuals reported income from the average of the incomes reported by all
other players. They nd that it is di¢ cult for players to coordinate to zero compliance without
communication. With communication, players succeed in coordinating to extreme a low compliance
level, but a cut-o¤ rule combining some random audit solves this problem. Our setup di¤ers from
theirs in that the game induced by the bounded rule does not need to be a coordination game.
Moreover, their focus is the cut-o¤ rule itself and the situations under which it is more e¤ective.
Our study, on the other hand, aims at comparing the e¤ects of two rules given a population with
the same income distribution.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, it provides evidence for a new cost-saving way of
doing audit selections. Although the literature only suggests that alternative audit rules contingent
on strategic interactions among players might be more deterrent, nothing is unknown about the
actual responses of taxpayers to these rules. We empirically show that the bounded rule is a more
cost-e¤ective than the traditional rule. Moreover, the bounded rule is robust in the presence of
coordination, in that it is di¢ cult for subjects to coordinate on the payo¤-dominant outcome.
Second, we perform structural estimation of non-expected utility for the rst time using data from
a tax compliance experiment. These behavioral models require less strict assumptions on cognitive
reasoning or the ability to formulate correct beliefs on others, and hence provide a much more
satisfactory account of behavior in our data. Moreover, the exercise of structural estimation allows
the possibility of comparing alternative behavioral models.
For the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes the tax compliance model and auditing rules that
are examined in the experiment. Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures. Section
4 formulates the testing hypotheses. Section 5 analyses experimental data with both nonparametric
and parameteric methods. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
2 Model Description
The model used in this study follows the basic setup in Yim (2009), following the classic compliance
game by Graetz et al. (1986). Consider a player population of size N . For simplicity, we assume
there are only two income classes: high and low, denoted IH and IL, respectively, where IL < IH .
Each player has a probability q of being a high-income taxpayer (H-type) and 1   q of being a
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low-income taxpayer (L-type), where 0 < q < 1. Players know the type distribution as well as
their own types, but they do not know the exact types of the other players. Each player has to
decide simultaneously and privately whether to report high-income (IH) or low-income (IL) to the
tax authority. Let TH and TL be the tax payment by high- and low-income taxpayers respectively,
where TH < IH , TL < IL, and TL < TH . If cheaters are audited, a ne F is imposed on top of the
tax they should have paid. However, taxpayers who report truthfully are never ned and incur no
cost if they are audited.
The traditional rule can be easily presented. Any taxpayer who has led low-incomereports
will face a at probability of aTR being audited independently. Since reporting truthfully does not
incur any cost by being audited, L-type players always state their income truthfully. If they report
a high-income, they will be taxed TH , which is strictly larger than the tax they need to pay if
they honestly state income TL. For H-type players, the honest-reporting payo¤ is IH  TH . If they
underreport, the payo¤ is IH   TL if they are not audited, and IH   TH   F if they are audited.
Therefore, they choose to underreport if the expected utility is strictly larger:
(1  aTR)U(IH   TL) + aTRU(IH   TH   F ) > U(IH   TH)
where U() is the utility function. If the audit probability is less than the threshold aTR dened
by
aTR =
U(IH   TL)  U(IH   TH)
U(IH   TL)  U(IH   TH   F )
the H-type players are expect to underreport. Otherwise, if the audit probability is larger than
aTR, then they choose to report truthfully. In the case of risk-neutrality, this threshold becomes
TH TL
F+TH TL .
Note, however, that the traditional rule does not model cost explicitly. In fact, it implicitly
assumes that the tax agency has the budget to do a full audit of N les. Moreover, the expected
number of audits is aTRN . This means the larger number of low-income report turned in, the
more les the auditor needs to check. In the following, we present an alternative auditing rule that
takes into account the resources of the tax agency. It allows the tax agency to induce the same
level of compliance with lower cost.
The bounded rule requires the auditor to rst set a committed budget characterized by the
maximum number of K audits allowed. It then constructs an audit sample size contingent on
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the number of low-income reports L. If L is smaller or equal to the audit capacity K, the
auditor will audit all L reports. However, if L is strictly larger than K, then the auditor will
randomly audit K reports. To put it more formally, the bounded rule selects an audit sample size
s(L) = minfK;Lg. Every low-income taxpayer faces a probability aL = minfK=L; 1g of being
audited (for L = 0; 1; :::N).
To illustrate how the bounded rule works, we focus on the analysis of H-type players, as L-type
players again have a dominant strategy of reporting truthfully.3 Similar to the traditional rule, the
H-type players face the tax evasion gamble of choosing a sure payo¤ of IH   TH , or a high payo¤
of IH   TL if they are not audited but a low payo¤ IH   TH   F otherwise. Unlike the traditional
rule, however, the audit probability, denoted by aBD, is no longer an exogenously given. Instead, it
depends on player is subjective belief on the likelihood of the proportion of low-incomereports
turned in by other players, denoted by Bi.
A low-income report could come from two sources. The rst source is from a truth-telling
L-type player with probability 1   q. Alternatively, it could come from H-type players lying as
L-type. If player i thinks that the under-reporting probability of H-type players is bi, this scenario
will occur with probability qbi. Hence the overall probability of observing a low-incomereport
Bi should be the sum of the probabilities in these two situations: Bi = 1   q + qbi. The overall
audit probability perceived for lying H-type taxpayers is now the sum of probabilities given that
none, one, two, ... or all N   1 other players submit low-incomereports, or more formally,
aBD =
N 1X
n=0
aLBin(n;N   1;Bi)
where Bin(n;N   1; 1   q + qbi) is the probability that exactly n out of N   1 players submit
low-incomereports. Bin represents the binominal distribution.
We assume that players are homogeneous, individual prot maximizers, and their beliefs are
symmetric in the equilibrium. Consequently, for a given set of parameters N , K, q, the game
among taxpayers induced by the bounded rule always exists an equilibrium.
3The actual percentage of honest reports among L-type taxpayers are 99.68% and 99.28% across treatments,
suggesting that they do play the dominant strategy.
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3 Experimental Design and Procedure
We design our experiments to compare the deterrence e¤ects of two auditing rules, and to study
players behavior under these mechanisms. The idea is to choose parameters which induces the same
level of compliance in both treatments. Based on the capacity constraint in the lab, we x the size
of the taxpayer population N = 8, and the audit capacity constraint K = 2 for the bounded rule..
The tax compliance game in both treatments has three stages: income reporting/tax deduction,
audit/ne deduction, and feedback. Subjects are endowed with either a high income IH of e25 or
a low income IL of e10 with probability q = 0:5. Subjects are informed about the group size and
the income distribution. During the income-reporting stage, they have to decide simultaneously
and privately the type of income to report to an auditor, which is simulated by a computer. The
computer automatically deducts taxes according to the reported incomes. The tax for subjects
reporting high income (TH) is e12.5, whereas the tax for subjects reporting low income (TL)
is e2.5.4 Subjects are told that taxes are deducted based on their reported incomes instead of
true incomes. For instance, high-income taxpayers will receive e22.5, instead of e12.5, if they
submit low-incomereports. Similarly, low-income taxpayers will receive -e2.5, instead of e7.5, if
they submit high-incomereports.5 In the audit stage, subjects reported e25 are never audited.
Subjects reported e10 potentially are subject to an audit depending on the treatments.
Traditional: We use a traditional rule as our baseline treatment. Subjects ling low-income
reports face an independent audit probability of 0.4. This audit probability induces comparable
compliance rate to the bounded rule. If they indeed report honestly, nothing will happen with
respect to their nal payo¤s. However, if cheaters are caught by the auditor, they need to pay back
the e10 of tax evaded plus a ne F of e10.6
Bounded: This is our target treatment. The audit probability depends on the total number of
low-incomereports received. The maximum number of audits to be conducted is K = 2. This
means if the number of low-income reports does not exceed two, all of them will be audited with
probability 100%. Otherwise, the audit probability is monotonically decreasing on the number of
4We attempt to choose the experimental parameters concerning taxation in line with the reality. For instance, the
real-world tax rates for high-income and low-income taxpayers are usually dependent on the levels of their incomes.
In particular, many European countries such as Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands use a progressive tax
system instead of a proportional one. Since we conducted this experiment in Europe, we decided to adopt a simplied
version of a progressive tax system for the sake of facilitating subjectsunderstanding.
5Even when a subject with low income makes a loss by submitting high incomereports and later this decision
was selected for payment, the potential loss will be still be covered by the show-up fee. During the experiment
sessions, this situation never actually happened.
6We implicitly assume that the auditor has su¢ cient resources in place to implement the traditional rule, which
potentially requires auditing all eight subjects in the taxpayer population of our experiment.
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low-income reports L. In particular, the probability is 0.67 for L = 3, 0.5 for L = 4, 0.4 for L = 5,
0.33 for L = 6, 0.29 for L = 7, and 0.25 for L = 8. This K parameter guarantees a unique Nash
equilibrium based on non-cooperative game theory. Fine for cheaters is exactly the same as the
Traditional treatment.
The experiment was conducted at the CentER Lab in Tilburg University from October to
December 2009. Tilburg University students, mostly major in economics or business, participated
as subjects in the experiment. Each treatment consisted of four sessions of 16 subjects each. The
duration of a session was about 1 hour (including the initial instruction and nal payment to
subjects). The average earnings are e16.23. We used Z-Tree software to program and conduct the
experiment ( Fischbacher (2007)).
The instructions used in our tax compliance game were modied from instructions in prior
studies of the literature, namely Alm et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2005), and Kim and Waller (2005)
(see Appendix B.2). At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to the
computer terminals. After nishing reading instruction, we had some quiz questions to test the
subjectsunderstanding of the game. Only after all subjects had answered all the questions correctly
did we start the experiment.
The game had 30 periods of play. At the beginning of each period, we randomly allocated 16
subjects into two groups of eight each to guarantee that a subject will not play with the same group
of participants again. This random re-matching design simulates a one-shot scenario but allows the
subjects to be familiar with the game environment. Since the group composition kept changing from
period to period, collusion among the subjects was extremely di¢ cult. At the end of each period,
a summary screen was shown to subjects with feedback information. The feedback information
included: (i) the subjects true income and the income reported and (ii) the nal payo¤ for the
period, including a ne, if any, for tax evasion. Subjects were not informed of otherspayo¤s.7
After completing the tax compliance experiment, subjects were asked to nish a risk elicitation
task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2002).8 The risk elicitation task required subjects
to make selections of a set of 21 lottery pairs. The purpose of this task is to obtain individual risk
aversion level and later use it to explain behavior in the tax experiment.
At the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to ll out two questionnaires. The rst
7We do not inform the subjects whether they are audited. The purpose of not explicitly present such feedback is
to discourage players experiencing the audit probability when they are L-type. As for the H-type players, it is very
easy to know whether their le have been audited or not from the nal payo¤s.
8We handed out the instructions for the risk elicitation task only after the tax compliance game, so that the
subjects were not aware of its existence beforehand.
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one concerns social background information such as gender, nationality, and experience of learning
economics. Moreover, we also elicited subjectsMachiavelli scores by means of the Machiavellian
scale personality test (see Christie and Geis (1970)).9 The second one contains questions on their
perceptions of the treatment designs in order to assess the e¤ectiveness of treatment manipulations.
Upon nishing the questionnaires, we randomly selected one period of the tax game and the
realization of one lottery to determine the nal payment of a subject. This random payment scheme
mitigates the potential income e¤ect that could confound experimental results.10A show-up fee of
e3 was added on top of the total earnings so that no subjects left the lab with loss.
4 Testing Hypotheses
We present our hypotheses regarding the deterrence e¤ects of both rules. The deterrence e¤ect
is indicated by the underreporting rate in the population, namely, the proportion of high-income
taxpayers ling low-incomereports in a certain period. As discussed in Section 2, our analysis
will focus on the H-type taxpayers, as the L-type players have a dominant strategy of reporting
honestly regardless of the auditing rules.
In the following analysis, we let h be the honestly reporting strategy for H-type players, and u to
be the underreporting strategy. As the audit probability aTR is set to be 0.4 for the traditional rule,
an under-reporting decision is equivalent to selecting a lottery of e22.5 with probability 0.6 and e2.5
with probability 0.4. The expected payo¤ is therefore: E(u) = e22:50:6+e2:50:4 = e14:5. As
it is strictly larger than the sure payo¤ e12.5 of reporting honestly, H-type taxpayers are expected
to underreport.
Under the bounded rule, the audit probability is not exogenously given, but depends on per-
ception of the players. Recall that the probability of n low-income reports submitted by the
remaining N   1 taxpayers follows the binomial distribution Bin (n;N   1; Bi). If a H-type player
decides to underreport, the sample size of low-incomereport will increase by 1 and every reported
low-incomeplayer faces an audit sample size s(1 + n;K), with correspondence audit probability
of aL = minfK=(1 + n); 1g. In summary, the expected payo¤ of lying H-type taxpayers is now the
sum of the payo¤s given that none, one, two..., or all N 1 of other players handing in low-income
reports:
9This test measures a persons preposition to be opportunistic and manipulative; with higher scores meaning that
these properties are more pronounced.
10The Starmer and Sugden (1991) study shows that such a random lottery incentive system does not distort a
subjects true preference.
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E(u;N; q;K) =
N 1X
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; Bi) [(1  aL) (IH   TL) + aL  (IH   TH   F )]
The Nash equilibrium of this game can be reached by elimination of dominated strategies.
Reporting high-income is a dominated strategy for L-type players, since they will be taxed accord-
ingly and incur a strictly lower payo¤ than otherwise. If the H-type players believe L-type obey
dominance, then the strategy of reporting truthfully (h) is dominated. Assuming symmetry and
unbiased belief among players, we can derive the equilibrium under-reporting decisions.
Proposition 1 The game introduced by the bounded rule is dominance solvable. In this equilibrium,
both the L-type and H-type players report low-income.
Proof: See appendix A.
Note that the above hypothesis holds for strategic, self-interest prot maximizers. Now suppose
that some players are intrinsically honest, namely, they report their income truthfully regarless of
their type. This assumption does not change the direction in terms of treatment di¤erences. Recall
that in the Bounded treatment, the optimal strategy of the H-type players does not depend on
their beliefs towards other H-type players. Why? As long as they believe that L-type will not play
dominated strategy (i.e. reporting high-income), they can form expectation on the proportion of
low-income reports led in each realized income distributions. Since the ex-ante probability of
being a L-type player is su¢ ciently high (q = 0:5), a H-type player nds that the sure payo¤ of
reporting honestly to be lower than then expected payo¤ from underreporting, even when s/she does
not expect any other H-type to underreport. The analysis in the Traditional treatment is simpler.
As player decisions are independent, the presence of honest players will not a¤ect decisions of
the self-interest prot maximizers. If the percentage of intrincially honest players is the same in
both treatments, the compliance rate should be the same. For the mathematical formulation see
Appendix A.
We build our hypothesis based on the above proposition:
Hypothesis 1 The under-reporting rate is the same under both rules: bTR = bBD:
The expected number of audits under the Tradtional treatment, LTR, depends on the number
of low-income reports. Let pTR denote the percentage of players submitted low-income. If
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pTR > 58 , L
TR will be larger than that 2 audits committed in the Bounded treatment. If the cost
of an audit is the same in both treatments, fewer audits in the Bounded treatment means lower
implementation cost. Hence, we advance the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 If the percentage of low-incomereport submitted is larger than 62.5% , the number
of audits is smaller in the Bounded treatment than in the Traditional treatment. That means, the
bounded rule is cheaper to implement to achieve the same level of compliance.
5 Results
5.1 Average Treatment E¤ect
Table 1 summarizes descriptive results of non-compliance behavior and prot across experimental
treatments. All statistics reported in this table are on session level. The left panel contains averages
over all 30 periods of play, and the right panel is the results for the last 10 periods, where behavioral
pattern is more stable.
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Table 1: Summary statistics accross treatments(standard errors in parentheses)
All 30 Periods Last 10 Periods
Overall Characterization Traditional Bounded Traditional Bounded
All subjects
High-income probability 0.514
(0.007)
0.491
(0.039)
0.527
(0.042)
0.519
(0.038)
Percentage of low-incomereports 79.741%
(0.074)
78.853%
(0.015)
77.969%
(0.066)
75.935%
(0.018)
H-type subjects
Under-report frequency 60.829%
(0.144)
57.114%
(0.049)
58.163%
(0.143)
53.321%
(0.052)
Average under-report prot 14.513
(0.650)
16.446
(0.285)
13.272
(0.967)
15.781
(1.979)
Auditing statstics
Total audit number 153.751
(18.140)
120
(0.000)
53.75
(8.098)
40
(0.000)
Average audit number
(per group per period)
2.563
(0.300)
2
(0.000)
2.692
(0.414)
2
(0.000)
Audit frequency 40.161%
(0.030)
31.712%
(0.006)
42.958%
(0.038)
32.943%
(0.007)
Budget usage ratio 32.033%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
32.091%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
Cheater detection rate 38.762%
(0.065)
33.134%
(0.043)
42.082%
(0.107)
31.876%
(0.125)
The two rows on top of the table report statistics concerning all subjects. The rst row indicates
that the actual probability of being a H-type in both treatments is very close to their pre-specied
levels with repeated drawing. The second row displays the percentage of low-income reports among
all reports, including reports from L-type taxpayers and the fake ones by H-type players. This
number is around 80% in both treatments, which satises the condition in Hypothesis 2 that
allowing us to compare the implementation costs of two rules.
The next two rows focus on H-type taxpayers, whom are the main interest of our study. The
third row reports the overall under-report frequency, which is 60.83% in the Traditional treatment
and 57.11% in the Bounded treatment. A two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the under-report frequency of the two treatments are the same (p = 0:386),
although in the last 10 periods, the di¤erence becomes a bit larger (p = 0:193). The prot for
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the cheaters in the Bounded treatment is e2 higher (p < 0:05), maybe due to the fact that the
detection rate in this treatment is lower than that in the traditional rule (see the last row).
The nal four rows concern audit statistics. We nd two pieces of evidence supporting the
bounded rule to be more cost-e¤ective. To begin with, it can sustain the same level of compliance
with a lower cost. Due to the fact that the audtior e¤ectively commits to fewer audit resources
under the bounded rule, both the total audit number and the audit frequency are signicantly lower
(p < 0:05). This result is pretty robust even when we compare this average number of audits per
group per period (p < 0:05).
Apart from a lower implemenation cost, the bounded rule has a higher budget usage ratio. We
dene budget usage ratio to be the percentage of resources actually used for a given committed
budget. This gure is 100% in the Bounded treatment, which means that all resources committed
are used at their full capacity in each period (i.e. two audits). Under the traditional rule, the
budget usage ratio is only 32.03%. The ine¢ ciency comes from the fact that while auditor has to
prepare resources to do all eight audits in each period, only a small fraction of audits are actually
carried out.
The last column shows the e¤ectiveness in cheater detection. The success rate is higher in the
Traditional than the Bounded treatment, though not statistically signicant (p = 0:103).
By comparing behavior over 30 periods (left panel) to behavior in the last 10 periods (right
panel), we can see that in both treatments, the under-report rates decrease over time. Due to fewer
low-incomereports, the relative audit frequencies increase, and cheaters earn less. Nevertheless,
the results of cross treatment comparisons remain the same. We summarize two results in this
section:
Result 1 Hypothesis 1 is supported. The observed under-reporting rates are statistically the same
in both treatments, although the absolute levels are signicantly lower.
Result 2 Hypothesis 2 is supported. The bounded rule uses resources more e¢ ciently in that 1)
The average number of audits in the Bounded treatment is signicantly smaller than that in the
Traditional treatment, and 2) The budget usage ratio is higher.
5.2 Individual Behavior in the Game
Figure 1 displays the distribution of individual strategies for H-type players across treatments.
The horizontal axis represents subjectsunder-reporting frequency throughout the game, i.e. the
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percentage of times when they receive high-income and decide to under-report. The vertical axis
represents the percentages of players having the same strategy in each treatment.
Figure 1: Individual strategy categorization
A Mann-Whitney ranksum test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the strategy distributions
in the Traditional and Bounded treatments are the same ( p = 0:3224). According to this gure,
only 28.13% of the subjects in the Traditional treatment and 20.31% of subjects in the Bounded
treatment behave exactly in accordance with theory, namely, underreport when they are H-type
throughout the experiment. On the other hand, the percentage of intrinsically honest subjects
is 12.5% and 15.63% respectively. In sum, we can only explain about 40% of the data in the
Traditional treatment and 35% in the Bounded treatment. The remaining subjects report their
income truthfully even though evasion is attractive, at least to expected payo¤ maximizers. How-
ever, their behavior are quite stochastic, in that they switch between the two options with various
frequency.
How could we bridge the gap between theory and our data in the experiment? To begin with,
we argue that theory based on individual prot maximization makes two unrealistic assumptions
on behavior. The rst one is the assumption of perfect rationality. In reality, however, people are
usually bounded by the cognitive limitation of their minds given the amount of time they have to
make decisions. The second one is risk neutrality. Experimental literature documents mounting
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evidence that subjects are not risk neutral prot maximizers, but risk averse utility maximizers.
To relax the assumption of perfect rationality, we propose discrete choice model as a framework to
accommodates boundedly rational behavior (McFadden (2001)). Models under such framework are
motivated by empirical studies in which observed decisions exhibit some noises (see, e.g. Fischbacher
and Stefani (2007), Loomes (2005), Rieskamp (2008) and Wilcox (2009)). These noises could
come from observed sources like decisions errors, but also come from other unobserved or modeled
channels such as individual perception of the game, or the sensitivity to payo¤ changes. Due to
the presence of these noises, people make decision errors and hence are not consistent with their
choices. Our Baseline treatment is essentially a non-strategic choice-under-uncertainty problem to
H-type taxpayers. Therefore, the classic individual discrete choice model is a natural setting to
explore behavioral anomalies. The bounded treatment introduces interactions of players. A general
way to incorporate decision error is quantal response equilibrium rst proposed by McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995), which is based on the random utility maximization model of McFadden (1973).
According to the discrete choice framework, H-type taxpayers will choose to under-report if
and only if the di¤erence in the expected utilities is su¢ ciently large to exceed a stochastic error
denoted by ", i.e.,
EU(l)  h > "
where " is commonly assumed to be independently and identically distributed across players and
actions with a Type 1 extreme value (logit) distribution. The error can come from many sources
such as the inability to calculate the expected payo¤ or trembling hands during decision making. A
standard result of the discrete-choice model framework is that under the above error distributional
assumptions, the choice probability b for lying, i.e., the underreporting probability, is given by the
relation below:
b = PrfP (l) = 1g
= PrfEU(l)  h > "g
=
1
1 + exp
h
 EU(l) h
i (1)
The parameter  > 0 captures the sensitivity of subjects choices to the relative payo¤s of
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the two choices. When  approaches innity, players choose under-reporting and honest-reporting
with equal probability, independent of the relative expected payo¤s. When  decreases, on the
other hand, players put less probability weight on choices that yield suboptimal payo¤s, and the
probability that they make the optimal choice converges to 1 when  approaches to 0. Put it
di¤erently,  is an index of the measurement error when subjects form expected utility from under-
reporting. This is particularly true for subjects in the Bounded treatment, since the expected
payo¤ from under-reporting is computationally demanding. Even for subjects in the Traditional
treatment, more than half of the subjects switch between options due to unobserved reasons.
Within this framework, we can further relax the assumption of risk neutrality. In particular,
we estimate and compare three behavioral models: risk-aversion, loss aversion with and without
combining probability weighting. In the risk-aversion model, we assume that subjects have a
CRRA-form utility function u() = 
1 r
1 r .
11,12. This model also allows us to explicitly test the
assumption of risk neutrality. If the estimated r is signicantly di¤erent from zero, we can reject
the null hypothesis that subjects are risk neutral.
While the observed compliance behavior can be explained by risk attitude, it is also consistent
with the notion of loss aversion. Recent research has shown that that loss aversion provides a much
better account of tax evasion both in the lab and the eld (see, e.g. , El¤ers and Hessing (1997);
Yaniv (1999); King and She¤rin (2002); Dhami and al Nowaihi (2007); Dhami and Al-Nowaihi
(2010)). The loss aversion model characterizes individuals as loss averse in terms of reference
income, denoted by R. For a given amount of money, x > 0, and the value function v(x) (specied
below), losses are weighted more than gains (j   v( x)j > v(x)). We follow Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007,2010) by taking the honest ex-post tax income as the reference point: R = IH   TH . The
rationale of this reference point is as follows. If the reference point is selected di¤erently, say the
initial income or the income after cheating detection, then taxpayers are always in the domain of
losses or gains. In those cases, the asymmetry of gains and losses disappear, and we completely fall
11Alternative utility forms such as CARA and power-expo utility do not change the t of data.
12Data from tax compliance game alone does not have any identication power to jointly three parameters, since
it only contains two moments (i.e. the fraction subjects selecting the risky lottery in the traditional rule and that
in the bounded rule) given a xed payo¤ structure. To gain enough identication power, we pool data from both risk
elicitation task and tax compliance game.
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back to the framework of expected utility 13. The income relative to the reference point is:
i =
8<: IH   TH   F  R for i is caughtIH   TL  R for i is not caught
The form of the utility function follows Tversky and Kahneman (1992) dened separately over
gains and losses: U(i) = i if i  0, and U(i) =  ( i) if i < 0. The  and  are the
parameters controlling for the curvature of the utility functions, and  is the coe¢ cient of loss
aversion. Subjects are considered loss-averse if  > 1.
Besides value functions, subjects could also have a nonlinear transformation of the probability
scale, i.e. they overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities (see, e.g. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)). In order to examine the e¤ect of subjective probability weight, we estimate a
third model combining loss-averse utility form with probability weighting function. In particular,
we adopt a popular form of one-parameter probability weighting function: w(p) = p

(p+(1 p)) ,
where   0. Note that if  < 1, the weighting function has an inverted Sshape, which is concave
for low probabilities and convex for high probabilities, and crosses the diagonal at the probability
about 1/3.
Recall that H-type players are choosing between a safe lottery and a risky one with xed probabil-
ities in the traditional rule, but endogenous probabilities under the bounded rule. In the following,
we let parameter arepresenting the perceived audit probability in the Bounded treatment. We
are interested in the following question: If we transform a bounded rule into the context of a tradi-
tional rule, which exogenous audit probability abest justies behavior? Moreover, how do risk
attitude, probability weight, or loss aversion inuence subjectsperception of the audit probabil-
ity? The likelihood of under-reporting responses, conditional on the analytical method being true,
depends on observed choices in di¤erent treatments. The conditional log-likelihood is the following:
lnL(aitjyit) =
X
i;t
8<:yit  ln
0@ 1
1 + exp[h E(lie) ]
1A+(1  yit) ln
0@1  1
1 + exp[h E(lie) ]
1A9=;(2)
E(lie) =
8<: 0:6 22:5 + 0:4 2:5 for i 2 Traditional(1  a) 22:5 + a 2:5 for i 2 Bounded
13To be more specic, such framework is called Rank dependent expected utility theory (RDEU), which can
be considered as expected theory applied with a transformed cumulative probability distribution. See Dhami and
al-Nowaihi (2007) for more detail.
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where yi;t = 1(0) denotes that the subject i under-report (honest-report) in the tax compliance
game in period t. The results are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Comparison of behavioral models
Risk aversion Loss aversion
Loss aversion &
Probability Weighting
Traditional Bounded Traditional Bounded Traditional Bounded
Risk magnitude r
0.366
(0.350)
0.594
(0.055)
Gain domain curvature 
0.445
(0.034)
0.428
(0.038)
0.640
(0.459)
0.533
(0.075)
Loss domain curvature 
0.548
(0.052)
0.708
(0.030)
0.586
(0.068)
0.858
(0.073)
Loss aversion coe¢ cient 
1.100
(0.802)
1.148
(0.030)
1.674
(0.123)
1.283
(0.171)
Weighting parameter 
1.150
(0.193)
0.899
(0.120)
Perceived audit prob. a
0.336
(0.017)
0.305
(0.007)
0.240
(0.023)
Noise 
0.667
(0.067)
0.618
(0.098)
0.266
(0.019)
0.256
(0.424)
0.430
(0.042)
0.289
(0.040)
Log-likelihood -1163.773 -1087.292 -1141.710 -1082.473 -1141.353 -1082.111
Observations 2331 2287 2331 2287 2331 2287
Notes: *10% signicance; **5% signicance, ***1% signicance. The standard errors are clustered on subjects.
At the rst glance, all parameters in these models are signicant, suggesting that the alternative
behavioral models help explaining the compliance behavior in our study. For instance, the risk
aversion specication tells us that subjects are risk averse in both treatments, as the CRRA coe¢ -
cient r is signicantly larger than zero. The indicates risk aversion helps to explain our data. The
perceived audit probability for a risk averse subject in the Bounded treatment is about 0.34. The
explanation is straight-forward: To induce a similar compliance pattern among subjects who are
risk-averse, we only need to tunethe audit capacity of the bounded rule such that it is equivalent
to a traditional rule with audit probability a = 0:336. In other words, we need fewer resources to
acheive the same level of compliance for risk-averse subjects than risk-neutral ones.
In the loss aversion specication, subjects in both treatments exhibit loss aversion: The coe¢ -
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cients of the loss aversion parameter  are larger than 1 in both treatments, which means subjects
are more sensitive to loss than comparable magnitude of gain. The slopes of the value function in-
dicate concavity in the gain domain () and convexity in the loss domain (). Moreoever, A Vuong
test on non-nested models favors the loss aversion model over risk aversion model (z =  3:690). If
subjects are loss-averse, the bounded rule is even cheaper to implement, as we only need to induce
the compliance rate similar to a traditional rule with audit probability a = 0:306.
We also run a third model combining loss aversion utility and probability weighting together.
However, we do not nd signicant improvement in the likelihood. Moreover, the probability
weighting parameter  is not signicantly di¤erent from 1 for both treatments (p = 0:438 and 0:397
respectively). It means that the average subjective probability of the subjects is pretty much in
line with the objective audit probability. Overall, the results seem to indicate that the driving force
for behavior is more likely in the way they view losses and gains, rather than the way they assess
probabilities.
Figure 2: Observed and predicted non-compliance rates
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Figure 2 displays the observed and predicted under-reporting rates based on risk and loss aversion
models. Since estimation results suggest that probability weighting does not explain the data
well, we take parameter estimates from the second specication: loss aversion without probability
weighting. Among the three models, the one by loss aversion ts our data the best. Result 3
summarizes the section.
Result 3 The proportion of compliance behavior in both treatments is consistent with the presence
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of loss aversion together with some stochastic decision errors, although not in probability weighting.
5.3 Coordination under the Bounded Rule
So far, the game introduced by the bounded rule is dominance solvable. In fact, it is not di¢ cult to
show that as long as the ex-ante probability of receiving high income is lower than 0.5, the H-type
players always under-report given the dominant strategy of L-type. Essentially, the more L-type
players who for sure honestly state their type in the population, it easier for the H-type players to
pretend to be L-type.
In this subsection, we examine the bounded rule in another paramter domain where the game
has multiple equilibria. In this new bounded-rule treatment called Strong-Economy, everything
remains the same as Bounded treatment except that the ex-ante probability of receiving high-
income q becomes 0:9 instead of 0:5. According to standard game theory, the introduction of the
bounded rule with the same audit capacity changes the interaction of players into a coordination
game with incomplete information. There are two pure strategy NEs and one mixed strategy NE in
the game. In the pure strategy equilibria, L-type players play their dominant strategy of reporting
truthfully. All H-type players play under-reporting (truth-reporting) if they believe other H-type
players are going to cheat with probability higher(lower) than 0:432. There is also a symmetric
mixed strategy NE bSE = 0:432.14
Studying behavior under a di¤erent q parameter has practical purpose as well. Remember the
discussion in section 2 that the parameter q determines an important property of the bounded rule:
A high q resembles a rich neighborhood where each inhabitant is very likely to be wealthy. Hence,
this new treatment helps us explore the performance of the bounded rule at the high end of the
income distribution. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether the bounded rule loses
the deterrence e¤ect in the presence of coordination.
The overall under-report rate in the Strong-Economy treatment is 33:95% over all 30 periods,
and 26:16% in the last 10 periods. According to Figure 3, it is clear that the deterrence e¤ect is the
strongest, as the under-report frequency is signicantly lower compared to the other two treatments
(a two-sided Mann-Whitney ranksum test with p < 0:05). This di¤erence is already salient in the
rst period, and remains highly signicant throughout the game. Interestingly, although the total
number of audits is smaller in this treatment even compared to the Bounded treatment ( p < 0:05),
14For the proof please refer to appendix A. Note that there are other asymmetric equilibria in the game. However,
we ignore them in a symmetric setting, since these equilibria require unrealistic coordination among symmetric
players.
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Figure 3: Under-report rate over 30 periods
the audit frequency turns out to be signicantly higher ( p < 0:05), due to the fact that there are
fewer low-incomereports needed to be audited. The audit success rate is remarkably higher as
well ( p < 0:05), leading the lying H-type taxpayers a signicantly lower payo¤ than the Traditional
treatment (p < 0:05). The average budget usage ratio is 95.63%, which is again signicantly higher
than that under the traditional rule (32.03%).
Result 4 The non-compliance rate in the Strong-Economy treatment is signicantly lower than
both the Traditional and the Bounded treatments. This high deterrence rate is acheived with a
signicantly lower implementation cost, and a high budget usage ratio.
In the last subsection, we showed that behavior in both treatments is consistent with a loss aver-
sion model with stochastic decision errors. To examine how they explain pattern in this treatment,
we do the following exercise. We rst estimate the perceived audit probability of the Strong-
Economy treatment given the ,  and  parameters obtained in the Bounded treatment. Then
we use all thse information to calculate the predicted under-reporting rate of the treatment bbSE . It
turns out that bbSE is 33.80%, which is again very close to the actual prediction 33.95%. This is an
indication that behavior in the Strong-Economy treatment is again consistent with the loss-aversion
model with decision errors.
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Interestingly, the preceived probability in the Strong-Economy treatment, 0.344, is only mildly
larger than that in the Bounded treatment, 0.305. That means given a ve percentage increase in
audit probability perception leads to a 23 percent increase in compliance level. This asymmetry
lies in the fact that subjects value gains and losses di¤erently to the reference point. When the
perceived audit probability is 0.305 in the Bounded treatment, the value of under-reporting is in the
gain domain, and marginally larger than 0, the value of the reference point. When this probability
increases to 0.344 however, the value of under-reporting falls into the loss domain with a larger
distance to the reference point. Since subjects are loss-averse, they weight losses more than gains,
and hence lower under-reporting frequency more drastically.
How does loss aversion link to coordination failure? If taxpayers are expected prot maximizers,
they will underreport as long as they think the probability that others are going to underreport
is larger than 0:432. It would be much harder, on the other hand, for loss-averse players to
choose to underreport. Given that they are more sensitive to losses than gains, they will choose
to underreport only when they think the other H-types are going to under-report with probability
higher than 0:774. This threshold requires more coordination among taxpayers, and involves a
substantially higher degree of strategic uncertainty.
According to Brandenburger (1996) denition, strategic uncertainty arises when there is un-
certainty concerning the purposeful behaviour of players in an interactive decision situation, as
opposed to a game against nature. Strategic uncertainty is widely documented in the many exper-
imental studies such as the coordination games (e.g. Huyck et al. (1990), Huyck et al. (1991)) and
market entry games (e.g. Sundali et al. (1995); Erev and Rapoport (1998)). Recently, Heinemann
et al. (2009) propose a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents
analogous to measure risk attitudes in lotteries. In their experiment, N subjects have to choose
simultaneously between a series of lotteries pairs. In each pair, lottery A always yields a sure
at payo¤, and lottery B yields a payo¤ if the minimum number of players selected is k. They
nd that the number of B-choices in coordination games decreases with an increasing coordination
requirement k. If holding k constant, N has a strong positive e¤ect on coordination, since a large
N reduces the relative hurdle to coordination. These behavioral patterns indicate that subjects
are strategic uncertainty averse. Applying the study by Heinemann et al. (2009), we argue that
the risk-dominant equilibrium is more likely to be chosen by the loss-averse subjects than expected
prot maximizers.
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5.4 Learning and Social demographics
In the post-questionnaire, we ask subjects their social background information such as gender and
nationality. This information allows us to study how subjects form and adjust their under-reporting
decisions under di¤erent rules. The rst specication concerns compliance behavior. We use the
following random-e¤ect probit model specication:
yit = xit + i + "it
where y equals 1 if subjects decide to under-report, and equal to 0 otherwise. Furthermore, x
is a vector of explanatory variables, the i represent individual random e¤ects and  is a vector
of parameters. The explanatory variables include subjects social backgrounds such as gender,
nationality and experience of economics, under-report performance in last period, time and its
square term.
Besides compliance behavior, we also investigate how individual characteristics and previous
performance inuence playersperceived audit probability of the bounded rules. To do that, we
re-run loss aversion model in section 5.2 and allow the perceived a parameter in model 2 depends
social background information: ba = x + "it. The results of the two specications are shown in
Table 3.
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Table 3: Under-report inuences of social background and learning
Compliance behavior Audit Probability Perception
Traditional Bounded Strong-Economy Bounded Strong-Economy
Under-report Detection Experience
-0.102
(0.186)
-0.498
(0.195)
0.010
(0.105)
0.075
(0.038)
0.030

(0.006)
Period
-0.039
(0.026)
-0.040
(0.032)
-0.082
(0.023)
0.008
(0.007)
0.002

(0.006)
Period2
0.0006
(0.0008)
0.0004
(0.0009)
0.001
(0.0006)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
Gender (1 for men)
0.756
(0.413)
0.960
(0.544)
0.459
(0.478)
-0.020
(0.017)
0.003
(0.011)
Years of learning economics
0.052
(0.186)
0.797
(0.287)
0.278
(0.214)
-0.015
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.005)
Econ experience  Game-theory 0.083
(0.144)
-0.574
(0.274)
-0.066
(0.187)
0.012
(0.013)
-0.0009
(0.004)
Dummy for Eastern Europeans
0.015
(0.899)
-0.409
(0.922)
0.125
(0.925)
0.043
(0.022)
-0.020
(0.201)
Dummy for Dutch
-0.102
(0.691)
1.190
(0.777)
0.620
(0.677)
0.004
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.018)
Dummy for Chinese
-0.234
(0.652)
1.336
(0.798)
-0.009
(0.778)
-0.003
(0.019)
-0.014
(0.023)
Dummy for other Asian
-0.878
(0.784)
0.159
(0.971)
0.940
(0.968)
0.022
(0.025)
-0.026
(0.023)
Mach-IV Scale
0.025
(0.016)
-0.019
(0.018)
0.018
(0.015)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.0003
(0.004)
Tax Filing Experience
-0.005
(0.458)
-0.304
(0.492)
-0.339
(0.575)
0.011
(0.012)
0.001
(0.011)
Constant
-0.508
(2.091)
5.318
(2.308)
0.918
(1.800)
0.209
(0.042)
0.305
(0.038)
Log-likelihood -444.868 -359.410 -640.430 -997.726 -1437.232
Observations 957 912 1670 2256 3014
Notes: *10% signicance; **5% signicance, ***1% signicance. We only include observations which players receive
high-income. Standard errors are clustered on individuals.
It is clear that learning a¤ect subjects in di¤erent ways across treatments. In the Bounded
treatment, detection experience in the previous round decreases non-compliance propensity. Inter-
estingly, players with economics background are more likely to under-report, an evidence suggesting
that training in economics might results in behavior more in line with homo economicus. These
e¤ects, however, do not exist in the other two treatments. In both Traditional and Bounded treat-
ments, men are more likely to under-report than women. However, this is not the case in the
Strong-Economy treatment. In fact, no other social demographic information a¤ects behavior ex-
cept for time. When we let perceived audit probability depends on social demographic information
under the bounded rule treatments, the only variable signicant is the lag audited experience. That
is, if a cheater was caught in the previous period, the perceived audit probability increases. This
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pattern is largely in line with reinforcement learning. The invariant inuences for social background
information might indicate that the e¤ect of bounded rules are robust and does not subject to much
change with respect to subjectssocial background information, especially in the Strong-Economy
treatment.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we compare the deterrence e¤ect of a new auditing rule, the bounded rule, to the
traditional rule in a controlled laboratory environment. In a tax compliance game, subjects are
endowed with a high- or low-income with a certain probability. On being notied a pre-specied
audit rule (traditional or bounded), their task is to report the type of income to the auditor.
Individual prot maximization and non-cooperative game theory suggest that the two rules induce
the same level of compliance. We nd that the compliance rate in the bounded rule is indeed the
same as that in the traditional rule. Given the same compliance level induced, the bounded rule is
more cost-e¤ective in terms of both implementation cost and budget usage ratio.
Although the theory predicts correctly the directions regarding treatment di¤erence, it does
not do well in predicting the absolute levels. We nd that compliance rates are higher than the
prediction in both treatments, even taking into account the fraction of intrinsically honest players.
In both treatments, at least half of the subjects comply to a certain extent, but switch their choices
alternatively. To explain behavioral anomalies, we introduce discrete choice models, within which
we compare several alternative models. We nd that loss aversion combining with stochastic errors
are more successful at tracking observed data patterns.
In a bounded rule with multiple equilibria, the subjects fail to coordinate on the payo¤-dominant
outcome. In both bounded rule treatments, the total number of audits is signicantly lower than
in the traditional rule treatment. Moreover, the bounded rule commits fewer resources (2 audits
versus 8 audits for the traditional rule), and uses these commited resources more e¢ ciently. Hence,
we can safely conclude that the bounded rule is a more cost-e¤ective audit mechanism compared
to the traditional rule.
What can we learn from this experiment? The experiment data strongly favors the bounded rule
to be a superior audit selection rule. The rst advantage is that it helps the auditors to plan budget
more e¢ ciently and more precisely. Many large organizations such as National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Atomic Energy Agency
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(IAEA) typically requires divisions to have their budget plans approved before they can spend
money on activities in the following year. A more e¢ cient planning like the bounded rule can pin
down the exact budget needed for the activity of auditing, and hence decreases the unnecessarily
reserved resources. The second advantage is that the bounded rule is cheaper to use. When the per-
centage of red-agreports are large, the bounded rule needs only fewer implementation resources
in achieving the same level of compliance. It might be useful in combating self-employed rms in
developing countries where the government has a constrainted budget to audit the unpaid taxes.
Moreover, the bounded rule performs even better when the income distribution is right-skewed.
Combined with the fact that the bounded rule requires fewer resources, it could be particularly
useful for developed countries with high cost of employing audit manpower.
The use of experiment also helps studying behavior under the two selection rules. We nd that
people act like loss-averse with stochastic errors in such settings, rather than expected prot max-
imizers. History of play also a¤ects their perception toward audit probability under the bounded
rule. Incorporating this evidence would better help tax administration to adjust their policies to
encourage people in paying their taxes in a more cost-e¤ective way.
This is just a rst step into the investigation of the bounded rule. In our current setup, taxpayers
can only decide whether to under-report or honestly report. In our future study, we could extend
the model so that they can also specify how much to under-report. Another possible extension is
to introduce human auditor to further examine the strategic interactions. Taxpayers are able to
communicate with each other in reality. Alm and McKee (2004) have shown that such cheap-talk
communication could help taxpayers to coordinate on non-compliance (payo¤-dominant) outcome.
However, if a strategic auditor could observe this, he is able to adjust the audit capacity accordingly
to combat collusion among taxpayers.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is trivial that reporting high-income is a dominated strategy for the L-type players.
To prove that H-type players have a undominated strategy of under-reporting given that L-type
players comply dominance, we need to show that the expected payo¤ from underreporting will be
strictly larger than the sure payo¤ from reporting truthfully. Moreoever, this holds regardless of
the beliefs H-type players bi 2 [0; 1] towards the other H-type players. For simplicity, we assume
that every player is homogeneous so that bi = b. The sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully is 12:5.
The expected payo¤ from underreporting is:
E(lie) =
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; Bi) fmin( 2
n+ 1
; 1) F + [1 min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)] Sg
= S   (S   F )
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; Bi)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
= 22:5  20
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; Bi)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
Where B = (1 q)+qb given previous discussion. Since b 2 [0; 1] and q = 0:5, B 2 [12 ; 1]. In order
to show that E(lie) is strictly larger than 12:5, we need to prove
N 1P
n=0
Bin (n;N 1; Bi)min( 2n+1 ; 1)
is smaller than 0:5 for any B 2 [12 ; 1].
Rearranging Temp =
N 1P
n=0
Bin (n;N   1; Bi)min( 2n+1 ; 1), we have:
Temp = Bin(0; 7; B) +Bin(1; 7; B) +
N 1P
n=2
Bin(n;N   1; B) ( 2
n+ 1
)
= Bin(0; 7; B) +Bin(1; 7; B) +
N 1P
n=2
Bin(n;N   1; B) (1  n  1
n+ 1
)
=
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; B) 
N 1P
n=2
Bin(n;N   1; B) (n  1
n+ 1
)
= 1 
N 1P
n=2
Bin(n;N   1; B) (n  1
n+ 1
)
Therefore, we need to show that
N 1P
n=2
Bin (n;N   1; B) (n 1n+1) is larger than 0:5 for any given
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B 2 [12 ; 1]. By plugging q = 0:5 and N = 7, spreading and re-arranging the each term in the
binomial distribution, we have the following polynomial with degree seven: F = 7B2   17:5B3 +
21B4   14B5 + 5B6   0:75B7. Taking the rst derivative yields a polynomial with degree six:
@F
@B
=  5:25B6 + 30B5   70B4 + 84B3   52:5B2 + 14B
= (5:25B5   5:25B6) + (24:75B5   70B4 + 49:5B3) + (34:5B2   52:5B2 + 14B)
The rst term, (5:25B5   5:25B6), is always non-negative if B 2 [12 ; 1]. It is not di¢ cult to
show that the second and the third terms are always positive for any given B 2 [12 ; 1]. Hence,
@F
@B > 0, which means that
N 1P
n=2
Bin (n;N   1; B)  (n 1n+1) is increasing in B for any B 2 [12 ; 1].
When B = 0:5, Fmin = 0:5098, which is strictly larger than 0:5. Hence the H-type players choose
to underreport conditional on the dominant strategy of the L-type players.
Next, we prove that the introduction of intrinsically honest players does not change the directions
of treatment di¤erence. Let  be the proportion of honest players, and 1    be the proportion
of strategic, self-interest prot maximizers, 0 <  < 1. We assume that the  is the same in both
treatments. Now we only need to show that the existence of intrinsically honest players does not
a¤ect the strategy of prot maximizers. When the strategic players are assigned to be L-type, they
gain a higher payo¤ by reporting truthfully, regardless of the auditing rule implemented. In the
Traditional treatment, H-type prot maximizers only compares a sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully
and the tax evasion gamble if they underreport. Hence, the existence of honest players will not
a¤ect their choices. In the Bounded treatment, the subjective beliefs of strategic, H-type players
of the number of low-incomereports now become: B = (1  q) + q(1  )b. Given that q = 0:5,
0 <  < 1, B still lies in the interval [12 ; 1]. Therefore, the remaining analysis follows the proof of
Proposition 1 above.
In the presence of honest players, the non-compliance rate of both treatments will be1  .
A.2 Equilibrium analysis for Strong-Economy Treatment
Let i(j) be the probability type i player (H-type or L-type) will strategy j (u or h). There are
two pure Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in this treatment:
f(H(u) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(h) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(u) = 0:432; L(h) = 1)g
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In words, the two pure NEs are 1) all H-type players under-report and 2) all H-type players honestly
report. L-type players always honestly report.
Let us examine the former case. Given a H-type player thinks that all other H-type players
choose strategy u, he will have an expected payo¤ of 17.5 by playing strategy l. By deviating to h,
the payo¤ decreases to 12.5. Since we assume symmetry among players, no one has the incentive
to deviate from under-reporting, which constitutes a NE. A highly similar analysis applies to the
latter case. Given that all other H-type players play strategy h, a strategy deviation from h to l
will yield a lower expected payo¤ for H-type players (from 12.5 to 3.59). Hence no one has the
incentive to deviate.
On top of the two pure equilibria, there is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each H-type
taxpayer is indi¤erent between honest-report and under-report. Given that the game parameters,
the under-report probability b which induces utility indi¤erence is bSE = 0:432.
Note that there are other asymmetric equilibria in the game. However, we ignore them in a
symmetric setting, since these equilibria require unrealistic coordination among symmetric players.
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B Instructions
B.1 Instructions Comparison
The instructions given in the next subsection are for the Bounded treatment. It di¤ers from the
instructions for the other treatments as follows:
 Traditional treatment
1. The second bullet (concerning matching protocol) of the list under Task Description
in the instructions for the Tax Compliance Gameis absent.
2. The Audit Probability Tableis absent.
3. The phrase see audit prob. tablein the Payo¤ Tablebecomes 0.4.
 Strong-Economy treatment
1. In the third bullet of the list under Task Descriptionin the instructions for the Tax
Compliance Game, the probability of receiving 25 becomes 0.9, and accordingly the
probability of receiving 10 becomes 0.1.
2. In the Payo¤ Table (immediately before Payment Method in the instructions for
the Tax Compliance Game), the probabilities in the second column become 0.9 and
0.1, respectively.
B.2 Instructions for Bounded Treatment
 Please read these instructions carefully!
 Please do not talk to your neighbours and remain quiet during the entire experiment.
 If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to you to answer it.
 You will receive a show-up fee of e3 for completing all tasks in the experiment, independent
of your performance.
Task Description
 This session consists of 30 periods of play; each period is completely independent of the others.
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 Of the participants in the room, two groups of 8 participants will be randomly formed at the
beginning of each period. You will not know the identity of the other players in your group
in any period.
 At the beginning of each period, you will receive a taxable income of either e25 or e10. The
probability of receiving e25 is 0.5; and the probability of receiving e10 is 0.5.
 Your task is to report your income to the auditor, which is played by a computer. The amount
that you report is your decision. You can report either e25 or e10, regardless of your received
income.
After-tax Income Determination
Your after-tax income in this period is determined by the following two steps: tax payment and
an audit.
Step One: Tax payment
The tax rate is 50% for those who reported e25 and 25% for those who reported e10. Suppose
the income you received is e25:
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals to e25 e12.5 = e12.5.
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals to e25 e2.5 = e22.5.
Suppose the income you received is 10:
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals to e10 e2.5 = e7.5.
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals to e10 e12.5 = -e2.5.
 In sum, the auditor charges tax based on your reported income, instead of your received
income.
Step Two: Audit
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The auditor does not know your received income unless your report is later audited.
Auditing procedure:
 If your reported income is e25, it will not be audited. That means what you have earned
in step one (e12.5 or -e2.5) will be your after-tax income (if received income is 25 and 10
respectively).
 Regardless of your received income, if your reported income is e10, there is a chance that
your report will be audited. The outcome is as follows:
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is also e10. Then what you
have earned in step one (e7.5) will be your after-tax income no matter whether your report
is audited or not.
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is e25. If your report is not
audited, you will keep the e22.5 earned in step one; if audited, you will get e2.5.
Auditing probability:
The number of reports the auditor will audit depends on the number of players reporting an
income of e10 in a group.
- If the number of e10 income report is equal to two or less, the auditor will audit all e10
reports.
- If the number of e10 income report is three or more, then two out of such reports will be
selected for audit randomly.
 The following table named Audit Probability Table shows the audit probabilities for a
player who reported an income of e10.
Audit Probability Table
Number of e10 reports 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Audit Probability 100% 100% 100% 66:7% 50% 40% 33:3% 28:6% 25%
 The following table named Payo¤ Table summarizes all possible scenarios you may en-
counter in one period and the related payo¤s:
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Payo¤ Table
Received Probability Reported Audit After-tax Income After-tax Income
Income Income Probability if audited if NOT audited
e25 0:5 e25 0 e12:5 e12:5
e10 see audit prob. table e2:5 e22:5
e10 0:5 e10 see audit prob. table e7:5 e7:5
e25 0  e2:5  e2:5
Payment Method
 At the end of this experiment, one out of 30 periods will be selected to determine your payo¤
for this task. The computer program will generate a random number from 1 to 30. This
number will determine one of the 30 periods. Your performance in that period determines
your payo¤.
 You will be paid in based on your after-tax income for the randomly selected period.
 Because each period is equally likely to be selected for payment determination, you should
make your decision in each period as if that period would be selected for payment.
 Your payo¤ will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment along with your earnings
in the other task(s).
We will now explain how the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
Period     1 out of 30                                                Remaining time [sec]:  36
Your taxable income is: € 25
        What is the amount of income you report to the auditor?
Your Decision: €10 口
€ 25 口
Report___
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Here you can decide the amount of income to report to the auditor. Please select either e10
or e25, and conrm your choice by pressing the Reportbutton.
Warning: Before pressing the button, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change your
decision after you have pressed OK.
SCREEN 2
Period       1 out of 30 Remaining time [sec]: 40
                      The results of this period are as follows:
    Income you received: € 25
Income you reported: € 10
    Your after-tax income in this period: €22.5
OK___
This is the feedback table you will receive regarding your after-tax income. Your will nd
information on the initial taxable income you received, the income you reported and your after-tax
income in this period.
Click on OK when you nish checking the information.
Note that the purpose of the screen shots is to clarify the procedure, rather than provide advice
about how to act. You should make the decisions that are best for you.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment.
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B.2.1 Risk Elicitation Task15
Task Description
In this task, you are asked to make decisions to 21 choice pairs. In each choice pair, you need
to select between two lotteries labeled Lottery Aand Lottery B. Please, take your time and
read each choice pair carefully. An example of a typical choice pair is given below:
Choice Lottery A e5.5 with probability 0.5 or e3.5 with probability 0.5 Your Lottery A 
No.1 Lottery B e9 with probability 0.5 or e0.5 with probability 0.5 choice: Lottery B 
Payment Method
 You need to make choices for all 21 choice pairs. However, only one of the 21 choices you have
made will be chosen for the payo¤ determination of this task. First, the computer program
will generate a random number from 1 to 21. This number will determine a choice pair. Then,
the computer program will simulate the lottery you have chosen and reveal the outcome on
your screen. The outcome of this lottery will determine your payo¤.
 For example, suppose that the computer program has generated a random number 2. It will
then check what you have selected in choice pair number 2. Suppose that you have chosen
Lottery A in that choice pair. Then the computer program will simulate Lottery A and
reveal your payo¤ (either e5.5 or e3.5). Your payo¤ will be paid out in cash at the end of
the experiment along with your earnings for the other task.
It is important that you fully understand the lottery selection task. Please raise your hand if
you have any questions at this moment.
15The risk elicitation task is conducted after the tax compliance game. However, the subjects do not know the
existence of this task when they were playing the tax compliance game.
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B.2.2 Post-experimental Questions
Questions on Treatment Manipulation
Please evaluate the following statements with respect to the tax reporting task:16
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion, 5=slightly agree,
6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly disagree
1. The instructions were clearly formulated.
2. I felt that I performed well on the task.
3. I received plenty of time to carry out the task.
4. I was motivated to do well on the task.
5. The task was fun to perform, motivating me to achieve a payo¤ as high as possible.
6. I considered the tax reporting task as fairly complex.
7. My payo¤ is determined not only by my own decision, but decisions of the other players.
8. When making my decision, I thought about what other players might do.
9. I feel obliged to report the received income in each period.
10. The chance I have received e25 is about 50%.17
Questions on Background Information
Please answer the following survey questions. Your answers will be used for this study only.
Individual data will not be exposed.
1. What is your gender?
2. What is your nationality?
3. How many years have you already studied in economics?
4. Have you have learnt a course related to game theory?
5. Have you ever had a part-time job?
16The rst ve questions are used to understand the subjectsperception about the experimental setup and instruc-
tions in general. We do not expect to nd di¤erences across treatments. The last ve questions focus on capturing
di¤erent types of manipulations of the treatments; therefore, we expect to see di¤erences across manipulations.
17 In the Strong-Economy treatment, the chance should be 90%, instead of 50%.
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Quesitons on Mach IV Scale18
In the following you will nd a list of statements. Please read them carefully and answer them to
what extent you agree or disagree. Even if in some cases you would like to say, that depending on
the circumstances, you should only choose one of the answers. Since all responses are anonymous
you can indicate without any worry. There is nobody on who you need to make a good impression.
Only if you answer very honestly can the results be used.
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion, 5=slightly
agree, 6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly disagree
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Most people are basically good and kind.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are
given a chance.
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, people wont work hard unless theyre forced to do so.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting
it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
13. The biggest di¤erence between most criminals and other people is that the criminals are
stupid enough to get caught.
18Question 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16 and 17 are reverse coded.
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14. Most people are brave.
15. It is wise to atter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that theres a sucker born every minute.
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
19. People su¤ering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to
death.
20. Most people forget more easily the death of their parents than the loss of their property.
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